



# Counterreconnaissance in the 21st Century:

*Developing and Defending the Security Zone in the Current Limited Conversion Division Configuration*

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“Counterreconnaissance is an inherent task in all security operations. Counterreconnaissance is the sum of all actions taken at all echelons to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts through the depth of the area of operations. Counterreconnaissance denies the enemy information about friendly units. It is both active and passive and includes combat action to destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance elements.”<sup>1</sup>

*The time is 1900 hours. The task force (TF) has just culminated in their movement to contact. They have sustained heavy combat losses, and are currently at 30 percent strength. The TF will conduct a defense in sector in the next 36 to 48 hours. The TF scout platoon leader is moving to the TF TOC to receive guidance on the upcoming mission. The company team (CO/TM) commander is coordinating his task as the counterrecon commander with the assistant S2 and S3 Air. The brigade recon troop (BRT) is conducting a zone reconnaissance to establish a screen forward of*

*the brigade. The opposing force infantry recon patrols and engineer recon patrols are moving unopposed in sector through the security zone. In the morning, the TF will begin engagement area (EA) development under enemy observation. The BLUFOR TF will react to enemy artillery for the next 24 to 48 hours. In the meantime, the enemy is gaining critical intelligence in preparation for their impending attack.*

Unfortunately, this short vignette occurs all too frequently at the combat training centers (CTCs). The leaders in this scenario — the TF XO, the TF scout platoon leader, counterrecon CO/TM commander, the BRT commander, the battalion intelligence and collection coordinator, and staff officers at various levels — want to do the right thing. The security zone fight has two major problems. First, is getting the aforementioned team together at the right time and location on the battlefield. Second, is focusing the security zone planners and executors on identifying, and more

importantly, destroying the enemy reconnaissance as the enemy attempts to penetrate into BLUFOR sector. This article outlines some systemic problems with counterreconnaissance in today's limited conversion division (LCD) configuration, such as how to streamline planning cycles to allow for synchronization at the brigade combat team (BCT), TF, and CO/TM level; and how to prepare, synchronize, rehearse, and execute this critical mission to achieve the endstate of enabling the lookers and killers in position to observe, report, and destroy enemy reconnaissance.

Despite the emphasized importance of winning the security zone fight, TFs often fail to plan and provide an adequate product to the counterrecon commander. History at CTCs clearly shows that TFs that are successful in destroying enemy recon elements are also successful in defending 85 to 90 percent of the time. That said, TFs generally do not focus enough on security zone planning, preparing, and synchronizing the

fight. Additionally, the current modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) omits the fourth maneuver element, and the TF has the added challenge of developing a viable plan that provides enough combat power in the counterrecon to destroy the enemy recon when the scouts identify the enemy in sector.

## Doctrinal Foundation

There is still no stand alone U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) that provides commanders a direction for planning, preparing, and executing. The 17 series covers screening tasks for scouts. FM 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*, discusses defense in sector, defending a battle position, and hasty defense.<sup>2</sup> With respect to the brigade's portion of the security zone, FM 3-90.3, *The Mounted Brigade Combat Team*, chapter 4, discusses capabilities and mission profiles in security operations.<sup>3</sup> FM 3-90.3 fails to address the actual command and control (C2) architecture with BRT integration into TFs. This is the significant negative trend observed with the observation plan at both brigade and TF levels at the Combat Maneuver Training Center. The two separate reconnaissance fights create a gap of intelligence, thus violating the continuous observation of enemy recon elements. Additionally, there is FM 34-2-1, *Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance*, which is very helpful to S2s.<sup>4</sup> FM 34-2-1 identifies what determines good priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and the development of reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations. FM 34-2-1 specifically states that "This is a 'how to' manual. It describes how to:

- Plan R&S operations.
- Task R&S assets.
- Graphically depict R&S operations.
- Execute R&S operations.
- Save time in the planning process.
- Plan for intelligence support to counterreconnaissance missions.

This manual shows you how to succeed in your reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance efforts.<sup>5</sup> Despite what FM 34-2-1 states, it is not a how to manual for counterrecon operations. FM 34-2-1 lacks the detail required to assist the ground maneuver commander in managing the collection assets in con-

cert with his killers. It is also outdated and does not contain the proper equipment or systems that are present in the Legacy Force.

**Time-sensitive planning.** The limited time factor in the planning process for the security zone fight is a key consideration. The BRT is moving to reestablish the brigade forward line of own troops (FLOT) and prepare for the deep fight. Available TF scouts are moving to the TF tactical operations center (TOC) with their phase line (PL) to receive guidance and resupply prior to their movement to the screen. The company is executing consolidation and reorganization. The TF sends out a fragmentary order (FRAGO) assigning a company to establish a hasty defense along PL Silver. One problem — the company has not generated adequate combat power to repel an enemy recon force in a TF size sector, and the CO/TM selected is still conducting consolidation and reorganization and has not accounted for everyone.

**Task organization and constraints.** Unlike the Division 86 MTOE, the LCD has added challenges. First and foremost, the TF has three CO/TMs, not four. In some divisions, the forward support company is attached to the TF and is not organic. By adding the BRT, TFs now have to deconflict the R&S plan. Commanders in the LCD configuration must address different challenges:


- How to task organize for the counterrecon fight, while maintaining significant combat power for the main battle area (MBA).
- Deciding what time in the planning process to task organize the counterrecon force.
- Giving the counterrecon commander enough time to start movement prior to the enemy recon.
- Ensuring the C2 architecture supports the mission, in terms of both battle command and communications.
- Ensuring a unity of command in both tactical and logistics tasks.
- How to transition from the previous mission to establishing a security zone.
- How to transition out of the security zone fight and reintegrate the counterrecon forces into the main defensive belt.
- Ensuring the BRT and TF scouts can provide enough reaction time to displace the counterrecon company back

into either a supporting effort role or a reserve position.

Once you begin to wargame how you will develop this, you have to weigh in the additional variables, such as the BRT's scheme of maneuver, adjacent TF's scouts plan, ground surveillance radar (GSR), and any divisional assets that will be operating in your battlespace.

## Plan

**Intelligence.** The most challenging task in the LCD configuration is managing additional collection assets. With the integration of the BRT, the TF S2s not only manage TF scouts, GSR, and additional forward observers (FOs) internal to the TF, but have the added responsibility of deconflicting cross FLOT assets of the BRT. TF scouts no longer have to escort brigade-level assets. So, how does the BRT counterrecon CO/TM synchronize their movement to the screen and refine their observation plan at the initial stages of the security zone development? There are many points to consider, including who is out there from the BRT; how did they move through the TF sector; what is their observation plan, dead space; and how much reaction time from BRT to TF scout? These questions, if not answered, will hinder the counterrecon CO/TM's ability to position tanks and Bradleys in key positions. This seems to be the major problem with the observation plan in the security zone fight. Scout platoons establishing reconnaissance hand-over lines with BRT platoons and building in the reaction time to allow the killers to actually achieve their tactical task seems to be a tough nut to crack. Many brigades attempt to plan after the security zone is set. Developing the brigade R&S plan late has a major impact on the BRT and a compounding impact on the TF scouts. By not synchronizing the initial observation plan at the brigade level, TFs are developing independent security zone plans that are not congruent with the brigade commander's intent. Figure 1 describes the critical planning times for transitioning offensive operations to defensive operations. The key task is using the TF liaison officer (LNO) to pull the essential information from brigade and push that key information to the TF. Developing the brigade R&S plan, and constant updates by the TF LNO will help the TF commander and S2 in refining PIR. The LNO can also assist the TF S2 by updating BRT locations



**Figure 1. Parallel Planning in Security Zone Fight**

throughout the early phase of the counterrecon battle. The BRT's location will help the scouts and counterrecon commander in their intelligence preparation of the battlefield.

**Maneuver.** The critical task for any military decisionmaking process is time management. It is no different from developing the security zone. The trend observed here is failing to integrate the TF LNO. The LNO can greatly enhance the speed at which the TF receives information from brigade. TFs generally wait for the issuance of the brigade operations order, which is too late. Using multiple warning orders allows the TF to begin the parallel planning necessary to establish the front, rear, and flank boundaries for the counterrecon commander. Therefore, analysis of the enemy's disruption zone must begin immediately. This is where both the brigade and battalion must be well rehearsed on the LNO's role. From a personnel perspective, this is where TFs must assign a very competent lieutenant or captain. All too often, the TF LNO is usually a young second lieutenant waiting for a tank or infantry platoon leader position. He would like to do well, but is just too young and does not know what he does not know.

The second trend observed is failing to plan on the objective. Failure to identify the decision point to transition from offensive operations to establishing the security zone is the genesis of the security-zone dilemma. FM 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*, states,

"To develop a [course of action] COA, the leader focuses on the actions on the objective and works backward to his start point."<sup>6</sup> It is the detail in analyzing the objective where TFs miss the opportunity to integrate their reconnaissance back into the fight. Other concerns are:

- Ensuring the counterrecon commander has enough combat power to initiate movement into the security zone at the prescribed time.
- Knowing the BRT's location. For example, are they already in sector; and when will the brigade or TF staff brief the counterrecon team?
- Ensuring the situation template is updated, to include when the observation plan and company graphics are due to the TF TOC.
- Knowing when the counterrecon commander will receive the refined graphics from the adjacent unit and the BRT.

**Fire support.** A consistent point of friction is getting the TF fire support officer (FSO) to submit input into the security zone development when the counterrecon team needs his attention. The FSO is usually in the middle of mission analysis or COA development for the main defensive fight. Using the fire support noncommissioned officer (FSNCO) is rarely observed, and the end result is the counterrecon commander and TF scout platoon do not receive support from the fire support element (FSE). The FSE, along with many

other battle operating system elements, must first articulate which tasks must be done by the entire staff, not just the primary staff officers. The TF XO and the rest of the primary staff must delegate who conducts which tasks. This allows for parallel planning, and by empowering the TF TOC personnel, will help educate the privates first class and other TOC members when they are up at 0200 hours talking and eavesdropping with the counterrecon CO/ TM. If the FSO has briefed his section, he can issue guidance to the FSNCO to assist the counterrecon commander, and the mortar and scout platoons in planning and developing the technical and tactical triggers for using both mortars and artillery. This also ensures identifying both mounted and dismounted avenues of approach.

Integrating GSR, scouts, FO teams, and sniper teams can provide depth and redundancy to the observation plan. Integrating TF mortars requires additional planning considerations such as the command relationship between the mortars and the counterrecon team to determine if they are attached or under TF control. In the Cavalry community, the answer would be troop/company control, such as ground cavalry troop configuration.

Attaching mortars, as well as scouts, prescribes a clearer unity of command. In the fires roll, this unity of command will reduce the clearance of fires and mission processing times. That said, the observed trend in the BCTs is to keep the mortars at TF level. If the mortars remain under TF control, then the entire TOC shifts and the staff must understand their role in the security zone effort, not just the TF FSO.

Positioning mortars is another issue. Positioning them forward to allow the guns to range the scout's named area of interest (NAI) coverage and disrupt enemy recon movement is one option. The other option is to focus the mortar fire in the depth of the security zone. This can create confusion among the multiple elements in the counterrecon force, and it may be too late to use mortars in a security zone saturated with BRTs, TF scouts, GSR, engineer recon teams, and infantry squads. Whatever method is used to support the counterrecon team, the cross talk with the S2, the FSO, and the battle captain/TF XO must occur to ensure clearance of fires in advance of contact.

**Mobility/countermobility/survivability.** During the initial planning phase



of the security zone, the task organization of the engineers is critical. Attaching engineer squads to the company provides assistance with emplacing hasty obstacles for the scout and tank sections to disrupt the enemy's recon element or turn it toward the counterrecon's EA. Additionally, the engineers can provide analysis with TerraBase or Falcon View, which can be used at ev-

ery level. The TF TOC can use the blowups to identify platoon-level graphics to understand tank platoon hide locations, route to the attack by fire (ABF) position, observation point (OP) locations, and routes where dismounted patrols are conducted. Terrain analysis products can also visualize dead space in the observation plan and assist in target refinement for using indirect fire.

**Combat service support.** The unit conducting the counterrecon must be the main effort. The S4 and TF XO need to assist the unit commander in his execution. This includes pushing the company/troup trains, to include the forward aid station (FAS), class V munitions packages that consist of M2/3, M1, and mortar ammunition, and designating the main supply route (MSRs) and the routes to and from each OP, mortar firing point (MFP), and tank and Bradley positions. Consolidated reporting should fall under the CO/TM. The scout platoon sergeant should be supported by the company first sergeant, so that the scout platoon sergeant should not have to worry about moving back to the TOC or logistic release point to get supplies. Consolidating the support effort also reduces unnecessary movement in the security zone.

**Battle command.** Establishing the communications architecture is a sensitive topic. With the development of the BRT, the TF scout is often unable to regain contact with enemy reconnaissance that the BRT identifies in the BCT sector. Figures 2 and 3 depict the new information flow dilemma facing our security zone fight with the LCD.

The lookers, BRT and TF scouts, often cross the line of departure without basic security information — what are the NAIs, their start and stop times, and who is at the front, rear, and flanks? The result is an observation plan with major gaps from the BCT to TF that violates multiple security fundamentals — you must provide continuous reconnaissance, reaction time, and maneuver space, and maintain contact with the enemy. Due to the nature of the security zone development, the lookers and killers do not meet prior to planning or preparation. Brigades are trying to synchronize the R&S effort with consolidated brigade level planning sessions. The problem is timing the R&S meeting. The time that they want to pull the security zone leaders from the entire BCT is at the same time that the counterrecon team is doing their company-level troop leading procedures (TLPs). Most coordination is conducted via frequency modulation (FM) by junior leaders with the initiative to figure out who is actually in their battlespace. An additional trend observed is that TF scouts or BRT scouts are reluctant to go to each other's nets and crosstalk, or to go to the company net and give the spot report to the killers. The reluctance of lookers at all levels to go to each oth-



er's respective net is the main reason for the current C2 configuration.

Another C2 hot topic is the commander of the recon fight. This unity of command affects all decisions in the security zone fight. At the executor level, can the CO/TM commander handle the mortars, scouts, CO/TM, and coordination with the BRT? With support from the TOC and the TF XO, he can. At CMTC, this point of friction is occurring. Does the TF XO or S3 assist the counterrecon commander during the night, or is it delegated to the battle captain? The function is not so difficult that the battle captain cannot coordinate with brigade on the status of the BRT and adjacent unit information. He can; however, there are certain situations that require the emphasis of the TF XO/S3 or commander. A technique is for the commander to establish events or criteria, commander's critical information requirements (CCIR), that the command group can use as a "wake up the boss or XO."

## Preparation

**Intelligence.** Updating the situation template with the order of battle is critical in this phase. Identifying the effects of weather on terrain is also beneficial for the security zone fight. Understanding what is a viable mounted route changes within a matter of hours when heavy precipitation occurs at the CMTC. Cloud cover affects the use of enemy air. Knowing that will also determine the composition of additional mounted and dismounted recon patrols.

Refining the observation plan is another critical tracking task in the preparation phase. The observation plans include the TF and BRT scouts, GSR, infantry squads, and any additional electronic assets that are integrated into the fight. The TF S2 can assist the counterrecon commander in clarifying BRT routes. By understanding the routes that the BRT used in their reconnaissance, the counterrecon commander can determine potential routes that the enemy recon may use to move into the security zone. This will also assist the counterrecon commander in determining the areas with the security zone that still need to be cleared. A common trend is for the BLUFOR to move to a screen line, set OPs without fully clearing templated enemy OPs, then calling the designated counterrecon CO/TM forward to occupy blocking positions without properly clearing the area. Owning the security zone entails zone, area, and

PREPARATION CHECKLIST/COUNTERRECON						
TASKS	CO/TM	BRT	TF SCTS	FIRES	ENG	C2
What is my sector of responsibility?						
Location and activities of BRT and TF scouts.						
Task organization. What does the CO/TM commander control?						
Enemy recon routes mounted/dismounted?						
Enemy expected timeline and composition?						
IPB complete, recon complete, FRAGO issued.						
Initial movement with available combat systems.						
Are expected avenues of approach covered by direct fire?						
Rearm and refit; LOGPAC prioritized?						
Direct fire plan developed, sector sketch at TOC complete.						
Common and detailed graphics BRT, TF scouts, CO/TM, TOC.						
Does each crew have FASCAM/obstacle overlay?						
FM rehearsal; sand table rehearsal? BRT, scouts, CO/TM, S2, chief of recon.						
PCIs complete?						
Coordination between lookers and killers complete.						
Rehearsed and timed routes.						
Responsibilities assigned to lookers and killers.						
MEDEVAC plan; how do we extract BRT/scout casualties?						
Integration of responsive fires – mortars.						
Are hasty obstacles emplaced and cited in with direct and indirect fires?						
Scout and CO/TM withdrawal plan, rearward passage of lines – timing, triggers.						
Follow-on mission – main defense, TF/BDE reserve?						
Do crews know counterrecon plan? Is sector architecture and task organization understood by all units?						
Can CO/TM commander C2 from his position?						
Rehearsed closure of obstacles and rearward passage of lines?						
Rehearsed air/ground volcano and MOPMS emplacement?						
Do crews know no-move time?						
Rest plan implemented?						
Timeline disseminated and enforced.						
Did the CO/TM commander provide refined graphics including obstacles, vehicle positions and EAs, TRPs and indirect fire targets to the TF TOC?						

**Figure 4.** A full-size version of this checklist is available under the "November-December 2002" back issue link on our website at [www.knox.army.mil/armormag/](http://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/).

route reconnaissance. This is especially true if the counterrecon force is going to displace and conduct a rearward passage of lines (RPOL) into its supporting effort role, or act as a reserve force.

**Maneuver.** Using a preparation checklist, such as the example above (Figure 4), will assist the counterrecon commander in helping him "see himself." The task force TOC should have the same checklist for the main defense belt as well as the security zone. The TF TOC should link the observation plan with this checklist to ensure that vehicle grids, OP locations, and routes are updated. This will allow the development of a common operational picture to be seen by all members of the security zone fight, as well as the TF.

The counterreconnaissance commander initiates movement of available com-

bat power on receipt of the TF fragmentary order (FRAGO). The commander receives minimum initial guidance from the TF, to include task organization; location of the BRT, TF scouts, and any other units operating in sector; graphics that depict sector boundaries; templated mounted and dismounted avenues of approach; no-movement time; friendly/enemy reconnaissance timeline; and civilian considerations. Preferably, the BRT commander, scout platoon leader, and counterrecon company commander linkup with the S2 and S3 to identify and prioritize enemy avenues of approach. Scouts conduct a zone reconnaissance to establish an early screen in depth to assist in the security of the counterreconnaissance unit as it pushes forward with available combat power. Prioritized avenues of approach, both mounted and dismounted, are immedi-



*“Understanding that counter-reconnaissance is a phase of the battle is critical. It is not a battle captain, scout, and the unlucky company commander’s mission. It is everybody’s responsibility...”*

ately covered with direct fire from available systems. Limited infantry assets are consolidated into focused patrols to key areas. As the unit builds combat power, they position and reinforce forces, and expand their overwatch with the goal of covering all expected enemy routes with direct fire and simple situational obstacles.

Generally, enemy reconnaissance is limited during the first 24 hours. Therefore, the initial counterrecon effort goes to initial positioning, and rehearsals. Ensure that rehearsals — sand table, mounted, and FM — are completed with all leaders, including lookers and killers, present during the initial 18 hours. Section-size engagement areas are identified and tied into direct and indirect fires, and obstacles are emplaced and documented on increasingly detailed graphics. Routes within the security zone and along displacement routes are reconnoitered and timed. Depth is established throughout the sector and specific areas of responsibilities are identified. Units preparing positions and operating in the main defensive area are continually updated on friendly and enemy activities in the counterrecon sector that may effect their activities. The counterrecon company is now prepared to destroy or repel all enemy reconnaissance in sector.

**Fire support.** The TF FSO and counterrecon company FSO must articulate the intent for indirect fires in support of both direct fire and the countermobility plan. The actual counterrecon battle is not the most ideal situation for using indirect fires. Firing missions on a moving light-skinned armor vehicle is hard to do. However, if the enemy is fixed or slowed at a hasty obstacle, mortars are the best choice, based on their responsiveness. The counterrecon team duties in the preparation phase consist of technical and tactical trigger

refinement. The company FSO can assist the counterrecon commander in refining the observation plan. The company FSO can work with the TF scouts and BRT on observer positions, and refining left and right limit and dead space. By doing this early in the prep phase, the counterrecon CO/TM realize where they can and cannot identify the enemy. A mounted rehearsal will validate the observation plan, and allow observers or killers to adjust their respective position and validate their triggers. Additionally, the mortar platoon can adjust their class V munitions stock, using more illumination and high explosive (HE) verse smoke. The illumination can facilitate rapid acquisition of both mounted and dismounted enemy recon elements. TF responsibilities include compiling the counterrecon plan and disseminating that information across the TF. Also, coordinate with brigade on priority targets and no-fire areas (NFAs) on all observers, killer, and C2 nodes. Finally, emplacing critical friendly zones on potential passage points will allow the TF to reintegrate that valuable third CO/TM back into the main defense.

**Mobility/countermobility/survivability.** During the preparation phase of the security zone, accounting for the obstacle effort in both the security zone and main defense is critical. It is crucial that the CO/TMs in the main defensive area know the composition and location of the obstacle plan in the security zone.

The counterrecon team must know of the countermobility plan in the main battle area (MBA), especially if they are conducting the RPOL. Marking the passage point and route to their subsequent position is critical. Not only marking the route, but also ensuring the counterrecon team understands the visual signal is very important. In the preparation phase, the engineer commander

and TF FSO, along with the counterrecon team commander, must refine any situational obstacles. The obstacle refinement is addressed initially in the planning phase, when the TF commander decides if the security zone will displace, or if it will fight in place. The actual refinement must be a part of the counterrecon-mounted rehearsal. On completion of the counterrecon rehearsal, the counterrecon team commander, the S2, and the FSO must all annotate the precise grids of all obstacles, and the intent of situational obstacles to be implemented in the security zone fight. The S2, the engineer, the TF FSO, and the commander must be on the ground together at the passage point and other critical areas of the security zone to confirm these critical points. On the completion of the ground coordination with the command and staff, the engineer cell can also update the terrain analysis products for the TF TOC and provide brigade a copy so that all TOCs continue to share a common operational picture.

**CSS.** As the counterrecon commander is integrating and refining the lookers and killers in the security zone, the TF staff is working with the XO/ISG to ensure the counterrecon fight is receiving the proper support. In the security zone fight, the counterrecon company 1SG is managing his company, plus the TF scouts and possibly the mortars. It is not feasible to develop four breaks of class I/III/V munitions, which causes too much movement in the security zone and degrades the number of eyes focused on the enemy. Allowing the 1SG/XO to execute this challenging CSS mission gives the counterrecon commander the flexibility to refit by sections. Consolidating the task organization under one CO/TM reduces the multiple moving units throughout the security zone. Eliminating the moving CSS operators will enhance the overall situ-

ational awareness for the counterrecon team. The TF XO ensures that the TF supports the counterrecon team. The TF S4 establishes a Class III/V push in the MBA for the counterrecon company if they displace back and fight. The TF S4 will also decide whether to push a FAS forward or collocate a definitive care provider with the company medics. The choice to commit the physician's assistant or surgeon forward reduces the died-of-wounds rate. Bottomline — it is the TF's responsibility to ensure that the assets are there for the CO/TM.

**Battle command.** The most important thing the TF TOC can do for the counterrecon commander is assist him in battlespace management. There are many leaders moving around in the EA. TFs must take the approach that they use during a live-fire exercise. Nobody moves unless the TF TOC knows about it. The counterrecon company must know about all personnel moving in the security zone. The lack of personnel accountability is a great contributor to fratricide and desensitizing the lookers. When the counterrecon force observes multiple soft-top HMMWVs driving around without any knowledge from the TF TOC, that degrades the lookers' ability to observe the important stuff — the enemy. The best thing the TF TOC can do for the counterrecon team is to maintain tight communication with brigade and adjacent TFs.

## Execute

**Counterrecon company and attachments.** The counterrecon team continues to focus on templated mounted and dismounted avenues of approach to destroy the enemy. Destruction of enemy reconnaissance assets must be the primary goal of security zone and counterreconnaissance operations. This implies aggressive execution of the counterrecon mission. Too often, unit leaders do not emphasize this basic imperative to subordinates. There is always the trade-off between stealth, such as hiding in the woods, and the ability to react quickly enough to destroy the enemy before he moves and is lost in the main defensive area. Normally, there is very limited threat to combat systems such as the M1/M2 from enemy reconnaissance assets — hiding in the woods will not accomplish the task. Stealth is only effective as it pertains to the ability of the counterreconnaissance unit to destroy the enemy. Massing direct fires with responsive mortar fires and integrating simple obstacles, such as wire and abatis, are essential.

The relationship between the lookers and killers is critical to accomplish this mission. The lookers must identify, then pass off the target to the killers. They must direct the killer to the enemy. Once the target is transferred to the killers, they have the responsibility to maintain contact, adjust their position as necessary, and aggressively pursue and destroy the enemy reconnaissance. All activities are continually monitored and updated by a decisionmaker at the TF TOC.

Vigilance on the part of the counterreconnaissance unit is key to mission success. Therefore, a workable rest plan must be established within the CO/TM. If the unit initially maintains 100 percent vigilance, then effectiveness will degrade over time. The result is enemy recon elements passing by sleeping soldiers at 0300 hours. We recommend 50 percent vigilance within crew or section, to ensure that there is always a combat system in each sector to react to scout reports.

**TF support assets.** Critical task in the initial development of the security zone is friendly force accountability. The counterrecon commander can manage the security zone; it is the TF external elements that are difficult to manage.

This article describes some techniques that will assist the staff and troops conducting the counterrecon mission. The preventive measures taken to streamline planning and prevent last minute coordination will pay big dividends on the ground for the lookers and killers trying to protect our battlespace as we prepare for defensive operations. Understanding that counterreconnaissance is a phase of the battle is critical. It is not a battle captain, scout, and the unlucky company commander's mission. It is everybody's responsibility — from the soldier patrolling around the TOC perimeter to the field train's command post gate guard. Security forces in depth is not intended solely for the cavalrymen; it is for everyone in the TF.

This article also focuses on the security zone fight as it applies to the LCD in the current form. That current form is BCTs in the correct size, without the advantages of the latest technology in the M1, M2, M3 series, as well as the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) complement of equipment. Once digitization is integrated into the remaining LCD units, their overall performance will obviously increase in their ability to manage infor-

mation and see themselves and the terrain.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Field Manual 17-97, *Cavalry Troop*, Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 3 October 1995.

<sup>2</sup>Field Manual 71-1, *Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*, Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 26 January 1998.

<sup>3</sup>Field Manual 3-90.3, *The Mounted Brigade Combat Team*, Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1 November 2001 (SS FM 71-3).

<sup>4</sup>Field Manual 34-2-1, *Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Reconnaissance and Surveillance and Intelligence Support to Counterreconnaissance*, Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 19 June 1991.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Field Manual 5-0 (101-5) *Army Planning and Orders Production*, Final Draft, Department of the Army, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 15 July 2002, TBP.

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